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PAYING FOR URBAN SARVICES
A STUDY  OF WATER  VEND'NG  AND WILLINGNESS
TO PAY  FOR  WATER IN ONITSHA,  NIGERIA
case  mdyEXBCUTIVE  SUMMARY
1.  The  scale and  magnitude of  water  vending activities in
metropolitan  areas  of developing  countries  has  not  been  widely  realized,
nor has the value of information  on such water vending systems  been
adequately  appreciated  by water resource  engineers  or policy  analysts.
This paper  presents  a case study  of  water  vending  in  Onitsha,  Nigeria--a
city of 700,000  people and one of the most important  market towns in
West Africa.  The paper illustrates  that a rapid reconnaissance  survey
of water  vending  activities  and the  willingness  of households  to pay  for
improved  water services  can yield  valuable  inforn  tion for  water  supply
planning and  unexpected policy  insights.  Such  studies are  very
inexpensive  relative  to the capital  costs of urban  water projects  and
should become a  standard part of  water supply project design and
planning  in developing  countries.
2.  The  vast majority of  Onitsha obtains its water  from an
elaborate  and  well-organized  water  vending  system  which  has  been  created
and is operated  by the  private  sector. Approximately  275 tanker  trucks
purchase  water from about 20 private boreholes  and then sell it to
households  and businesses  equipped  with water  storage  facilities. Many
of the households  which purchase  water from tanker  trucks  resell the
water  by the  bucket  to individuals  who cannot  afford  large  storage  tanks
or  who  cannot be  reached by  tanker trucks.  There are  literally
thou!1ands  of  small retail water vendors in Onitsha.  These small
retailers  not  only  sell  directly  to individuals,  but  also to other  water
vendors  who carry two 4-gallon  tins on their shoulders  with a pole and
deliver  water  directly  to a customer.
3.  During the dry season households  obtain approximately  2.96
million  gallons  per day (mgd)  from the water  vending  system,  for which
they  pay  about US$28,000.  In 1987 the  public water utility was
supplying  about 1.5  mgd during  the dry season,  only 50 percent  of the
amount supplied by the water vendors.  For this 1.5 mgd the water
utility  only managed  to collect  about  US$1,100  in revenues. During  the
dry season  the private  sector  water vending  system  was thus collecting
about 24 times as much revenue as the water utility.  In the rainy
season the  sales of  water vendors were still 10 times the revenue
collected by  the water utility.  On  an annual basis households in
Onitsha  are already  paying  water vendors  over twice the operation  and
maintenance  costs  of a piped  distribution  system.- ii  -
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I.  INTRODUCTION
1.01  For most water utilities  and donor  agencies  the actual  water
supply  situation  in many Third  World urban  areas is typically  something
of a mystery.  Where do households  obtain  their  water?  How  much water
do different  types  of households  use?  What do they  use the  water for?
How much do households  pay for water, if anything?  What does that
payment  represent  as a proportion  of household  income?  How  much would
they be  willing to  pay  for  improved water  services?  Most water
utilities simply do not know the answers to  such basic questions.
Conseq-  ntly,  new systems  are  generally  planned  and  designed  with little
understanding  of  household water demand  behavior.  Instead,  engineers
and planners tend to rely on very simplistic  assumptions  about what
determines  per  capita  water  use  and  affordability.
1.02  Unfortunately,  urban  water schemes  often fail to achieve  the
goals set for the number of households  to be connected  to the water
system, the amount of water produced, and  the proportion  of  costs
recovered--and  the  gap between  expectations  and  accomplishments  is  often
great  (World  Bank,  1988).  '-he  lack  of adequate  data on household  water
demand  appears  to  be one of the  reasons  for  these  shortfalls.
1.03  However,  it is  not  necessary  to plan,  design,  and  manage  water
systems  in the  dark.  Relatively  simple,  rapid  reconnaissance  surveys  of
household  water demand behavior  have been devised to nrovide policy-
relevant information  to water utility managers in a timely fashion.
This  paper  describes  one such  survey. A case study  of water  vending  and
willingness  to pay which was carried  out in Onitsha,  Nigeria,  in July
and  August  1987,  illustrates  how such studies  can be conducted  and what
kinds  of information  they  can  provide.l
1.04  The purpoF  of this particular  study was to estimate the
willingness  of households to pay for water so that the state water
authority  could  make a more informed  decision  on how  much to charge  its
customers. Stated  more simply,  the  general  manager  of the  water  utility
1/  This  paper  is  the  first  of several  reports  based  on the findiags  of
a  research  project on willingness  to pay for wacer in Anambra
State,  Nigeria,  funded  by the World Bank and the  USAID Water and
Sanitation  for  Health  Project  (WASH). In addition  to the research
in Onitsha--part  of which  is presented  in this  paper--surveys  were
conducted  in Enugu and in rural areas in collaboration  with the
Department  of Economics,  University  of  Nigeria,  Nsukka.wanted to know what was going on at the household  level in the water
sector  and needed some empirical  investigation  and analytical  work to
find -ut.
Background
1.05  Onitsha is a  rapidly growing city of about 700,000 people
located on  the  banks  of  the  Niger  in Anainbra  State  in  southern
Nigeria.  The public  water system  in Onitsha  was built  in the  1940s  and
extended  during  the 1960s.  Onitsha's  infrastructure,  and especially  its
water system,  was hard  hit during  the  1967-70  civil  war, and since  then
has been totally inadequate  to meet the needs of the population.  In
1981 the World Bank appraised a  water and  sanitation  project for
Onitsha, and  subsequently  made a  loan to  the Anambra State Water
Corporation  (ASWC)  which  included  funds  to finance  the  construction  of a
new water supply  scheme  for the city (see  Figure  1).  This  New Onitsha
Water  Scheme  was inaugurated  in  January,  i988,  soon  after  the  field  work
for  this  willingness-to-pay  study  was completed.
1.06  The ASWC ia concerned  about what prices  to charge  for water
from this new system.  As in other  parts  of Africa  (and indeed  much of
the world),  many people  in Anambra State  believe  that piped  water is a
public  service  which  the  government  should  provide  free  or for  a  nominal
fee.  Whatever  the merits  of this belief,  developing  countries  rarely
have enough resources at  their disposal to deliver such subsidized
services.
1.07  The basic  arguments  in favor  of higher  prices  are  well known:
to promote  more  efficient  use  of water;  to enable  the  water  authority  to
generate  adequate  revenues  to provide  a higher  level  of service;  and to
encourage  more  efficient  capacity  expansion. However,  water  authorities
in developing  countries  often  want to keep water  prices  low.  Not only
are they concerned about the equity (and political)  consequences  of
raising  water  prices,  but  also they  fear that people  cannot  or  will not
pay  higher  prices  and  will not connect  to (or  will disconnect  from)  the
piped  distribution  system  if prices  are raised. If  a significant  number
of households  disconnect  from the piped distribution  system  or reduce
consumption,  as a  result of a  price increase,  total revenues could
decline.  In such a case, people  would not receive the economic  and
health  benefits  of an improved  water  supply.
1.08  Until  the study  described  in this  paper  was undertaken,  there
was little  information  available  on household  demand  for improved  water
services  in  Nigeria  which  could  help  clarify  the issues  involved  in this
policy  discussion  (for  an exception,  see  Reedy,  1987).Figure  1
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II.  WATER  VENDING  IN  ONITSHA
A.  The  Study  Area
2.01  Onitsha is one of the most important  market towns of West
Africa,  and  much  of the  population  is engaged  in trading  activities. As
a result  of the  high level  ot entrepreneurial  enterprize,  Onitsha  has  a
relatively  prosperous  urban  economy. Average  annual  household  income  is
probably about  N  7000  (US$1600), but  roughly 25  percent of  the
households  have  an annual  income  below  N 2400 (US$560).
2.02  This relatively high level of  wealth is reflected in the
housing  stock  of Onitsha.  There  are  a  few thousand  modern  multistorey,
concrete  apartment buildings in Onitsha.  Most were constructed  with
indoor plumbing but have not yet been provided  with water from the
public  water system.  At the time of this study  people  living  in these
apartments  were waiting for the completion  of the New Onitsha Water
Scheme  and often for  the extension  of the  distribution  network  to their
neighborhood.  It was a common  sight  to see  women carrying  buckets  of
water into these  modern  apartment  buildings,  perhaps  so that  they could
flush  their  toilets. In some  parts  of the  city the  women  may fill  their
buckets  at shallow  wells  in the  middle  of a paved  sidewalk.
2.03  One-third  to one-half  of the population  of Onitsha lives in
squatter  settlements  in one  and two-room  tenements,  without  piped  water
or indoor toilets.  These areas are, however, generally  served with
electricity.
2.04  The average  household  size in Onitsha,  as in other parts of
Nigeria,  is six-to-seven  persons.  The majority  of the population  has
completed  at least primary school.  About 10 percent  of the heads of
household have no formal education,  and about 10 percent have some
education  beyond  secondary  school. Ibo is the  major  language  spoken  in
the  region.
B.  Description  of  Water-Vending  Practices  in Onitsha
2.05  Only about 8000 households  in Onitsha had functioning  water
connections  to the  public  water  supply  system  at the  time  this  study  was
undertaken. The vast majority  of the population  obtain  its  water  from
the  vending  system  which  has  been  created  and is operated  by the  private
sector.  This  water vending system is elaborate and well organized.
Approximately  275 tanker  trucks purchase  water from private  boreholes
and then sell it to households  and  businasses  equipped with water
storage  facilities  (generally  either  45-gallon  drums  or 500-1000  gallontanks).21  Tankers hold from 1000-2500  gallons.  There are probably
about  twenty  major  private  boreholes  scattered  throughout  the  city  which
supply tanker trucks.  Some of these private boreholes were -''illed
expressly to supply tanker trucks; others serve the water needs of
factories  or other  commercial  establishments  and sell to tanker  trucks
only  as a sideline. Some private  boreholes  sell  directly  to individuals
who walk to the borehole  and purchase  water by the bucket;  others  sell
only to tanker  trucks.
2.06  After filling their tanks, the tanker trucks cruise around
neighborhoods  in Onitsha looking fov  istomers.  Most do not  have
regular  customers;  none has fixed ro  .4.  In the dry season  a tanker
truck  might sell six to eight  loads per  day; in the rainy  season  about
three  to four  loads.
2.07  Many  of the  housenolds  which  purchase  water  from  tanker  trucks
resell  the water by the bucket to individuals  who cannot  afford  large
storage facilities  or who live in areas which cannot be reached by
tanker trucks.  Even though the 1000-gallon  storage tanks are quite
expensive--they  retail for about N  1500 (US$350)--many  households  in
Onitsha have made this large investment  in water trora,2  facilities.
Individuals  who purchase  water from tanker  trucks  and then resell  the
water by the bucket  can be called  "small  retail  water  vendors." There
are literally  thousands  of these  small  retail  water  vendors  in Onitsha;
the majority  of households  in Onitsha  are within  50 meters of such a
vendor. Most  open  between  6-6:30  a.m. and  close  between  9-9:30  p.m.
2.08  These small retailers  not only sell directly  to individuals,
but also to "distributing  vendors"  (or "hausa"  men) who  generally  carry
two 4-gallon  tins on their shoulders  with a pole.  These  distributing
vendors  may also purchase  their  water directly  from a ptivate  borehole
which sells to individuals  ,by the bucket.  Distributing  vendors sell
water throughout  the city.3  Most of the distributing  vendors  have a
few  customers  who  purchase  water  from  them  on a regular  basis.
2/  * - water volumes  reported  in this paper are "imperial  gallons."
The volume  of the tanker  trucks  and household  water storage  tanks
are not  standardized,  and  thus  the  volume  of a "500  gallon"  storage
tank  may vary  from  household  to household. The volumes  reported  in
this  paper  were  estimated  by respondents  themselves  and  should  only
be considered  approximations  of actual  volumes.
3/  The average distributing  vendor has been selling  water for 2.6
years.  Most work about  seven  hours  per day in the rainy  season  and
nine and half  hours  per day during  the  dry season. Almost  all the
distributing  vendors  sell  water  most of the year.  About  one half
work in other jobs.  Before  they started  selling  water,  most  were
either  farmers  or held  unskilled  jobs in the  informal  sector.-6-
2.09  In other words, households can  purchase water from three
points in the vending system.  If they live in an area accessible  to
tanker  trucks,  they  can purchase  a storage  tank  or drun.(s)  and buy  water
directly  from a tanker  truck.  If they are  willing  to  haul  water  by the
bucket  to their  homesp  they  can buy it directly  from  a private  borehole
or from a small  water retailer.  If the value  they place  on their  time
is high, they can have water delivered  directly to their door by a
distributing  vendor.
2.10  Of course,  none of this information  on how the water  vending
system  worked  was  available  in any systematic  way to the  ASWC;  all that
was known  was that "there  was a lot of water  vending  going  on."  Water
vending  was only mentioned twice in passing in the World Bank (1981)
project  appraisal  report,  and then only as one of numerous  sources  of
water  used by the  urban poor.  The scale  or magnitude  of water  vending
activities--and  the potential  importance  of these activities  for the
design  and  potential  success  of the  project--was  never  even  hinted  at.III. FIELD  PROCEDURES
3.01  The fieldwork  for this  study  was  conducted  over  a three-day
period  in July 1987 (this  time  was spent  developing  and pretesting
questionnaires  and  training  enumerators),  and  a ten-  ay  period  in  August
1987  (during  which  the  survey  work  was  conducted).4_  The  Anambra  State
Water  Corporation  made  available  ten  enumerators  for  the  study  and  an
experienced  water supply  engineer.  The enumerators  were temporary
employees  of the ASWC, generally  in their late teens;  all had a
secondary  school  education. The  management  of the  ASWC  was somewhat
skeptical  about the enumerators'  ability  to conduct  survey  work in
Onitsha  because  a few  months  earlier  they  had attempted  to  do  another
survey  and  the  whole  enterprise  had  collapsed.  There  were  also  concerns
that the "trading  mentality"  in Onitsha  made it very difficult  to
conduct  interviews  with  anyone.
3.02  The situation  could  thus  have  been  more  promising,  but  the
young  enumerators  from  the  ASWC  seemed  eager  and  brignt. In  order  to
turn the failure  of  the previous  survey  into an advantage,  the
enumeration  team  was  challenged  to  show  that  they  could  do  good  work  and
a sense  of "ownership"  in  the study  was instilled  in  the  enumerators.
However,  to  create  some  friendly  competition  between  enumeration  teams,
a  team  of five  gtduate students  in  economics  was  also  hired  from  the
local  university.-
3.03  Five  categories  of  people  were  interviewed:  31  tanker  truck
drivers,  12 managers  and attendants  of boreholes,  104 small  water
retailers,  34 distributing  vendors,  and 235  households.  In addition,
enumerators  were  placed  on tanker  trucks  and  rode  with  the  driver  all
day,  rec-rding  in  a log  book  the  time  required  to  fill  the  truck  at  the
borehole,  the number  of  sales,  the prices  charged  for different
quantities  of water,  and the status  of each customer  (resident  or
business),  and  the  number  of  customer(s)  who  would  resell  the  water. If
the customer  bought  water from the tanker  truck to resell,  the
enumerator  asked  him  how much he charged  his customers  and  how much
water  he purchased  per  week  on  average  in  the  rainy  season  and  in  the
dry  season.
3.04  Placing  an  enumerator  on  a tanker  truck  required  considerable
finesse  and negotiation  by our field  supervisors,  as well  as a N 10
payment  to  the  driver  of the  tanker  truck. As  the  study  proceeded,  it
4/  This was during  the rainy  season,  which  extends  from  April  to
October,  with  rainfall  peaking  in  September.  Rainfall  in  Onitsha
averages  about  2000  mm  per  year.
5/  As  it turned,  the employees  of the ASWC proved  to be good
enumerators.  The  2conomics  graduate  students,  on  the  other  hand,
did  not.became  clear that there  was a tanker  truck  drivers  union in  Onitsha.6/
Five days after  the interviews  with the  tanker  truck  drivers  began,  the
union  called  a special  meeting  and decided  to prohibit  its  members  from
cooperating  with the  study,  but by then  all the information  needed  from
the  drivers  had been collected  and the  survey  team  had proceeded  to the
household  interviews. It was possible  to place enumerators  on tanker
trucks  26 times,  and thus information  on 26 different  working  days of
tanker trucks was  collected.  This  information  provided concrete,
first-hand  observations  of the  water  vending  transactions  between  tanker
trucks,  households,  and small  retailers.
3.05  None of the  surveys  carried  out  as part  of this  research  could
be  conducted in  accordance with  rigorous social science research
protocols in the sense that it was not possible  to construct  well-
defined sample  frames  from which to select  the respondents. However,
care  was taken  in sample  selection  to avoid  obvious  sources  of bias,  and
all  five types  of interviews  were carried  out in  all the  major  districts
of the  city.  For  the  household  interviews  and the  interviews  with small
retailers,  enumerators  were dropped at points in a district  randomly
selected from a  block map of the city and instructed  to walk in a
particular  direction and  interview  every  other  house  or  small
retailer.  The household  interviews  were conducted  throughout  the  day,
but a special  effort  was made to catch  people  before  they  went to work
and in the evening  after they returned  from  work to avoid  oversampling
individuals  who were unemployed or worked at home.  Tanker trucks
selected to carry the er.umerators  were  identified  at several major
boreholes  in different  parts  of the  city and at different  times  in the
morning. For the  interviews  with  distributing  vendors,  enumerators  were
simply dropped in different  districts  and instructed  to interview  as
many such vendors  as they could locate.  The interviews  with borehole
managers  and attendants  presented  even more of a problem  in terms of
potential bias because many  refused to  talk with  the enumerators
(probably in part because they were afraid of being taxed on their
revenues  from  water  sales).
3.06  The  lack  of a  well-defined  sample  frame  is not  a problem  which
is unique  to this  study.  The  necessary  detailed,  up-to-date  population
data are not  available  in most urban  areas in developing  countries--and
particularly in  squatter settlements--to  implement survey research
designs in which every member of the urban population  has a  known
probability  of being selected.  When the necessary  secondary  data are
not available,  the construction  of such a sample  frame is simply  too
time consuming  and expensive  to be practical  for most policy-oriented
research  efforts  in which  information  is required  in a timely  manner  to
support  management  decisionmaking.
6/  For  more  information  on  the  tanker truck drivers union, see
Appendix, "Financial  Aspects of the Water Vending Business for
Different  Types  of  Water  Vendors,"  pp.  26-29.-9-
3.07  The  consequence  of this  lack  of a well-defined  sample  frame  is
that it is not possible  to be as confident  in the extrapolation  of the
findings  from the sample  to the general population  of Onitsha.  This
increased  level  of uncertainty  must be explicitly  addressed  by managers
and decisionmakers  working  in the  water sector. It is not a limitation
of  this  study per  se  in  the  sense  that there  is  no  reasonable
alternative  to the  sampling  approaches  used  given  the time  and  budgetary
constraints. The real question  for policy  makers  and managers  working
in the water sector  is thus not whether  they  would  prefer  to have more
reliable information  obtained from studies carried out in accordance
with rigorous social science research protocols versus the kind of
information provided by  the  type  of  rapid  reconnaissance surveys
described  in this  paper. Rather  the  choice  is between  information  which
can be obtained  from the kind of surveys  carried  out in this study  (or
information  which can be obteined  from other  kinds of fast,  relatively
inexpensive  studies).
3.08  Because  of the uncertainty  introduced  by the lack of a well-
defined sample frame, the surveys were designed to include as many
cross-checks on  the data  obtained from  the  various interviews as
possible. For example,  the  technique  of having  enumerators  ride  on the
tanker trucks made  it  possible to  verify much of  the  information
obtained from the interviews  conducted  with different  actors in the
water vending system  and with households.  Since the results  could  be
cross-checked  with  information  from  more than  one  source,  it is  possible
to be confident about the accuracy  of the general picture of water
vending  in Onitsha  which is  presented  in this  paper.- 10  -
IV.  MONEY  AND  WATER  TRANSACTIONS  IN  THE  WATER  VENDING
SYSTEM  IN  ONITSHA
4.01  From  the  information gathered during  the  course of  the
fieldwork,  it is possible  to piece together  a general picture  of how
money and water change hands in the water vending system  in Onitsha
during  both  the  rainy  and  dry  seasons.  These  transactions are
summarized  in  Figures  2  and 3.
4.02  In the  dry season  households  obtain  approximately  2.96  million
gallons per day (mgd) from the vending  system.  Of this vended  water
about 52  percent (1.55 mgd)  is purchased from small retail water
vendors,  for  which  households  pay  about  N 78,000  per  day.  Tanker  trucks
sell about 1  mgd, 34  percent of the  2.96 mgd  total, directly to
households,  which pay  approximately  N  20,000 per day.  Households
purchase another 0.11 mgd  from distributing vendors and  0.30 mgd
directly  from private  boreholes,  for  which they pay  N 14,000  and  N 8000
per  day, respectively.  Thus  households  are  paying  on average  a total  of
about  N 120,000  per  day (US$28,000)  to the  water  vending  industry  during
the  dry season.
4.03  Before  the  completion  of the  New  Onitsha  Water  Supply  Scheme,
the  Anambra  State  Water  Corporation  was supplying  about 1.5  mgd through
the public  water supply system  during the dry season,  only about 50
percent  of the  amount  supplied  by the  vending  system. For  this 1.5  mgd,
however, the ASWC managed to collect only about N 5000 (US$1160)  in
revenues.  During  the  dry season  the private  sector  vending  system  was
thus  collecting  about  24 times  as  much revenue  as the  water  utility.
4.04  As illustrated  in Figure  3, the major  change in this picture
in the rainy season  is that households  manage  to capture  about  2.3  mgd
of rain water.  This means that less water  needs to be purchased  from
the wa;qr  vending system: only 1.48 mgd  (half of  the dry  season
total)."  In the rainy  season  households  purchase  about 0.77  mgd from
small  water  retailers  (one  half the  volume  purchased  in the  dry  season),
for  which they  pay N 30,000. Tanker  trucks  supply  0.50  mgd  directly  to
households,  for which they collect  about N 7500. In the rainy season
households  purchase about 0.08 mgd from distributing  vendors (for N
10,000) and  0.13 mgd directly from boreholes (for N  3500).  Thus
households are  paying a  total of  about  N  51,000 per  day  (about
US$12,000)  to the vending system for water during the rainy season.
Although  this  is only  about  40 percent  of the  amount  paid  to vendors  in
the dry season,  it is still  over  ten times  the  revenue  collected  by the
ASWC.
7/  These  estimates  indicate  that  per  capita  water  use is significantly
higher  during  the  rainy  season  than  in the  dry season.FIGURE  2:  MONEY AND WATER TRANSACTIONS IN ONITSHA,
NIGERIA(PER DAY)- Dry Season
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*  Water  Input  is  not  equal  to  water  output  because  a  small  amount  of  water  is  consumed
by  small  retail  vendors  themselves.- 13  -
Table  1:  AVERAGE  PRICES  CHARGED  BY  VENDORS  IN ONITSHA,  NIGERIA
(Naira  per  gallon)
Rainy  Season  Dry  Season
Prices  charged  by
1.  Private  Boreholes
a.  to  Tanker  Trucks  N 0.003  /  gal  N 0.004  /  gal
b.  to Individuals  N 0.01  /  gal  N 0.02  /  gal
2.  Tanker  Trucks
to Individuals/Businesses
a.  per  1000  gallons  N 0.014  /  gal  N 0.018  / gal
b.  per  drum  N 0.04  /  gal  N 0.04  I  gal
3.  Small  retail  water
vendors
to Individuals  N 0.04  I  gal  N 0.05  /  gal
4.  Distributing  vendors
to Individuals  N 0.12 /  gal  N 0.13  I  gal
4.05  Table 1 summarizes  the prices charged by water vendors at
different  stages  of the  vending  distribution  system. Tanker  trucks  buy
water from boreholes for N  0.003-0.004  per gallon and  sell it to
individuals  for five to ten times this amount.  Small retail  vendors
charge  individuals  N 0.04-0.05  per gallon,  about three  times  what they
pay  tanker  trucks  for  the  water. On average  distributing  vendors  charge
N  0.12-0.13  per gallon, about three times the cost of water to the
distributing  vendor  if  he purchases  water  from  a small  retailer,  or
seven  times  the cost of water if he purchases  from a private  borehole.
A household  which purchases  its water from a distributing  vendor  pays
about eight times more per gallon than a household  which buys large
volumes  from  a tanker  truck.- 14  -
V.  RESULTS  OF THE  HOUSEHOLD  INTERVIEWS
5.01  Following  the interviews  with water vendors,  the enumeration
teams  gqnducted  235  in-depth  household  interviews  throughout
Onitsha.-/  The  questionnaire focused on  the  willingness of  the
household  to pay for water.  After explaining  that the survey  was part
of  a  World  Bank  study,  the  enumerator read  each  respondent a
carefully-worded  statement  that was designed  to set the scene for the
"bidding  game"  in  which  respondents  would  tell  whether  or not they  would
be willing to pay certain specified  amounts for water under certain
circumstances.  The  statement said that when the New Onitsha Water
Scheme was  commissioned and  when  distribution pipes  reached the
respondent's  neighborhood,  households  with private connections  would
have safe, reliable water 24 hours per day, all year around.  The
enumerator  next described a  situation in which each family with a
private connection  would have a meter installed,  and the household's
monthly  water  bill would  be determined  by the amount  of water  which  was
used.  The enumerator  compared  this  billing  procedure  to that currently
used for  electricity.
8/  The household  interview  had five parts.  The first  dealt  with the
basic socioeconomic  characteristics  of the household,  such  as the
number  of adults  and children  in the household.  The second  part
was concerned  with household water-use practices.  For each of
seven  possible  sources  of water (tanker  trucks,  neighbors  and small
retail  water  vendors,  distributing vendors,  shallow  wells,
rainwater  collection,  surface  water,  and  the  public  piped
distribution  system),  respondents  were asked questions  about the
following: (1)  whether  the  particular  source  was  available  in the
neighborhood;  (2) the prices  charged  for water from this source;
(3)  the quality of  water  from this  source; (4) whether this
household  obtains  water from this source,  and, if so,  how much is
used;  (5)  what  water  from  this source  is  used for.
The third part of the interview  consisted  of a series  of highly
structured  questions  designed  to determine  how  much  households  were
willing  to pay  for  improved  water  supplies. The fourth  part  of the
questionnaire  dealt with household  assets.  The enumerator  asked
for  information  on the  monthly  rent,  the  monthly  electric  bill,  the
number  of rooms  in the  house,  and whether  the  household  owned  each
of a  series of consumer  durable goods (such as a refrigerator,
radio,  air conditioner). In the fifth  part of the interview,  the
respondent  was asked to provide  information  on the occupations  of
different family members and  their total monthly cash income.
Respondents  were not asked to specify  precisely  the monthly cash
income  of family  members,  but rather  to indicate  the  category  into
which  their  income  fell.STOP
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5.02  The enumerator  then asked the respondent  whether he or she
would like to be connected  to the New Onitsha  Water Scheme  and have a
meter if the price  of water  were N 1 per  drum.9'  Figure  4 presents  in
schematic  formlVe way the the "bidding  game" proceeded  in response  to
this question.,  For example,  if the respondent  answered  "Yes" to a
price  of N 1 per drum,  then the enumerator  raised  the price  to N 2 per
drum, and again asked whether the respondent  would  like to have a
metered  connection. If the respondent  answered  "No" to a price  of N 2
per  drum,  the  enumerator  lowered  the  price  to N 1.50  per  drum,  and  again
asked  the  respondent whether  he  would  like  to  have  a  metered
connection.  After  this  question  was answered  the  enumerator  stopped  the
bidding game.  Similarly,  in the first instance  if a respondent  said
"No" to water  at N 1 per  drun.,  the price  was lowered  in increments  to  N
0.12.
5.03  Using  this  bidding  game  procedure,  it  was possible  to classify
each  household  into  one of the following  seven  groups  based  on how  much
the  respondent  indicated  the  household  was  willing  to pay  per  drum:
N 0.00  - 0.11 per  drum
N 0.12  - 0.24  "  "
N 0.25 - 0.49  "  "
N 0.50 - 0.99  "  "
N 1.00 - 1.50  "  "
N  1.50 - 1.99  "  "
>  N 2.00
9/  In  most  situations it  would  be  impossible to  carry  out  a
willingness-to-pay  survey  in  which  the  enumerator  raised  or lowered
the  commodity  price  in this  manner  because  individuals  would  simply
not know how much water they consumed  in terms  of a standardized
unit,  such as  a  drum.  However, because water vending is so
widespread  in  Onitsha,  not  only is  almost  everyone  used  to thinking
in terms  of using standardized  volumes  of water,  but they  are  also
used to paying for water by  the drum, bucket, or  1000-gallon
tank.  In this  sense,  Onitsha  was  an ideal  setting  for  conducting  a
willingness-to-pay  survey  in  which  the  price  of water  was varied.
10/  This  bidding game  approach for  estimating the willingness of
households  to pay for water is one of several possible  ways of
eliciting households'  preferences.  The general methodology  is
termed  the "contingent  valuation  method"  because  the respondent  is
asked how  he  would  behave in  a  hypothetical or  "contingent"
market. For  excellent  reviews  of the  current  state  of the  art, see
(a)  Ronald  C. Cummings,  David  S.  Brookshire,  and  William  D. Schulze
(editors),  1986, and (b) Robert  Cameroon  Mitchell  and Richard  T.
Carson, 1989.  For a discussion  of the application  of contingent
valuation techniques in  developing countries, see Whittington,
Briscoe,  and  Mu, 1987.- 17 -
Figure  5  presents  a  frequency distribution of  the  households,
willingness-to-pay  bids.  As illustrated,  respondents  generally  rePorted
that they were willing to pay substantial  amounts  for water.-  For
example,  at a price of N 0.25 per drum (about  N 5.4 per 1000 gallons)
about 87 percent of the sample households  reported that they would
connect  to the  piped  distribution  system. The price  of  water  charged  by
the vendors  was effectively  an upper bound on the amount respondents
would bid for  water; respondents  were not willing to pay  more than the
price  of water  charged  by vendors  because  the  water  provided  by  vendors
was  perceived  to  be of good quality  and  was  generally  readily  available.
5.04  Not only  did respondents  report  in the bidding  game that  they
would pay  substantial  amounts for water from the piped distribution
system,  but it is clear  from the  data collected  in the  questionnaire  on
current  water use practices  (and from the study  of water  vending)  that
households  were already paying  a lot for water.  Figure  6 presents  a
frequency  distribution  ot  reported  monthly expenditures  of households
for water during the dry and rainy seasons.  In the dry season 74
percent of the households  spent N  10 or more per month on water;  46
percent spent N  25 or more per month.  Even in the rainy season  46
percent  of the households  reported  spending  N 10 or more per month  on
water.
5.05  Monthly  expenditures  on  water  as a percent  of household  income
vary widely across households.  In the dry season  49 percent  of the
sample  households  report  spending  5 percent  or more of their  income  on
water  (Figure  7).  A  third of  the households reported spending 10
percent  or more of their income  for water in the dry season.  In the
rainy  season  25 percent  of the  households  still  spent  5 percent  or  more
of their  income  for  water.
5.06  It is the  poor in Onitsha  who  are paying  the  most for  water--
both in absolute  amounts  and in terms  of the  percentage  of their  income
spent on water.  Figure 8 presents  an estimate  of households  water
expenditures  as a percentage  of household income  during the dry and
rainy  seasons. Households  making  less than  N 500 per  month  (58  percent
of the total sample)  are estimated  to be paying  18 percent  of their
income  on water during  the dry season  versus  2-3  percent  for the  upper
income  households.
11/  It is possible,  of course,  that  respondents  may  have failed  to  give
reliable, truthful answers to the willingness-to-pay  questions.
For  example, respondents may  have  bid  low  in  the  hope  of
influencing  the  ASWC  to set  a low  price  for  water,  or they  may  have
bid high, thinking that a  high bid might convince  the ASWC to
extend  service  into  their  neighborhood  sooner. For  a discussion  of
the various ways used to test the reliability  of the bids, see
Whittington,  Briscoe, and Mu,  1987, and Whittington,  Mujwahuzi,








0 NQ0-ll  NO.12-0.24NO.25-0.49  *0.50-099*1.0O-149  #1.50-1.99 2*2.00
WILLINGNESS-TO-PAY  BIDS INAIRA PER 45  GALLON  DRUM
FIGURE 5:  FREQUENCY  DISTRIBUTION  OF  WILLINGNESS-TO-PAY  BIDS




C  RAINY  SEASON




ICN1  Nl-4  NS-9  N10-24  N25-49  N50-99  No1
MONTHLY  EXPENDITURE  ON WATER
FIGURE  6: FREQUENCY  DISTRIBUTION  OF  HOUSEHOLDS'  MONTHLY  EXPENDITURE
ON  WATER  (ONITSHA,  NIGERIA)'I  ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~0In
0
ft 40  ~~ ~  ~  ~  ~  ~  ~  ~  ~  ~ 
- I  ata
LI,  ....  ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~......
m  o
-4- I  I---  ---  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _.......0
CD,  _  _  _  _  _  __  _  _  _  _  _  _
to
rn  ~ ~ ~ ~  ~  ~  ~  ~  ~  ~  ~~~~~~~~~~I.




HOUSEHOLD  EXPENDITURES  ON WATER  AS
PERCENT  OF INCOME  BY INCOME  CLASS




10  -.  .
0
DRY SEASON  RAINY SEASON
HOUSEHOLD  INCOME  (NAIRA  PER MONTH)
_  0-499  M  600-799  LED  800-1999  M  2000 AND OVER- 22 -
5.07  In the  past it  has been  commonly  assumed  that  households  could
only afford to pay  3-5 percent of their income for improved  water
services,  so these data on the proportion  of household income  being
spent  on water in Onitsha  appear  extraordinarily  high.  However,  other
recent  studies  of water  vending  have also  shown  that  many  households  pay
much more than 3-5 percent  of their  income  on water.  For example,  in
perhaps  the  most  carefully  conduct2d  study  of  household water
expenditures among the urban  poor, it  was  found that the  poorest
households  in Port-au-Prince,  Haiti sometimes  spend  20 percent  of their
income  on water (Fass,  1988, p. 175).  In Addis  Ababa the urban poor
spend  up to 9 percent  of their  income  on water (Linn,  1983,  p. 159).  In
Ukunda, Kenya--a town of  about 5000 people 40  kilometers south of
Mombasa--it  was  found that on average  households  were spending  about 9
percent of their income on water from vendors;  many households  were
spending  a higher  percentage  (Whittington,  Lauria,  Okun,  and  Mu; 1988).
5.08  How could it be possible  that a househo)ld  in Onitsha would
spend 18 percent  of its income  on water during the dry season?  The
estimates  of household  income  upon  which  these  percentages  are based  are
only rough approximations  derived frcm answers to questions in the
household  questionnaire,  and some of the estimates  at the extremes  of
the frequency  distributions  presented  in Figures  6-8  may well be due  to
inaccurate data.  However, the  general magnitude of  the  results
presented  in  Figures  6-8 should  be correct.
5.09  For  example,  small  retail  vendors  sell  a substantial  portion--
probably  a majority--of  the  water  delivered  to households  by the  vending
system.  In the dry season  this  water is generally  sold  for  R  0.20 per
bucket.  Many single  males living  in tenements  in squatter  settlements
buy their water from a small retail  water vendor.  Such an individual
might buy two buckets  per day at a cost of N 0.40,  or N 12 per  month.
If he made N 75 per  month,  like many of the laborers  working  on tanker
trucks,  he would  pay 16 percent  of his income  for  water  during  the  dry
season.
5.10  Many  of families  interviewed  reported  water  consumption  during
the dry season  of 2 buckets per capita  per day.  If the average  size
family of six purchased  all of its water from a small retail  vendor,
this would entail  a daily expend-  ture on wateir  of N 2.4, or N 72 per
month.  Such  a monthly  expenditure  on water  is  not implausible;  in fact,
as  illustrated in  Figure  6,  almost  25  percent of  the  households
interviewed  reported  monthly  expenditures  on  water  during  the  dry season
of  more than  N 50.  If this  household  of six  had two  wage  earners  making
N 200 per month each, the  monthly  expenditures  on water  of N 72 would
represent  18 percent  of monthly  household  income. Of course,  many poor
families  do not buy  all of their  water from small  retail  water  vendors,
but, on the other  hand, some buy some of their  water  from distributing
vendors  at even  higher  prices.- 23  -
VI.  4.ONCLUDING  REMARKS  AND POLICY  IMPLICATIONS
6.01  This study  of water  vending  and the  willingness  of households
to pay for water reveals  a water supply  situation  in Onitsha  which is
really  quite extraordinary,  and one which puts the policy  debates  over
whether the poor can afford  water and whether  water should  be provided
as a subsidized  public  service  in a somewhat  different  perspective. At
the time of the fieldwork,  the ASWC  was not a major  actor  in the  water
market, based on market share defined  in terms  of sales.  The private
sector  vending  system  was responsible  for over 95 percent  of the  water
sales  in  monetary  terms. To argue  that  the  population  of  Onitsha  cannot
afford to pay for water is clearly  erroneous. Most people  in Onitsha
are already paying  high prices for water from the vending  system  for
service  which is inferior  to that  which  could  be provided  by a  well-run
piped  distribution  system.
6.02  At the time of the survey,  households  in Onitsha  were paying
water vendors  about N 30 million  annually  (US$7  million).  The annual
capital  and operation  and maintenance  costs of the New Onitsha Water
Scheme  are  difficult  to estimate  from  the  information  available. At the
time the new  system was  inaugurated,  the World Bank had  disbursed
approximately  US$35 million for construction  and engineering  services.
The  Anambra  State  Water  Corporation  had probably  spent  the  equivalent  of
US$5 million.  However,  the distribution  network  is not yet complete.
Assuming  that the total  capital  costs  will eventually  reach  US$100  per
capita for households  with private connections  when the distribution
network is completed  and that 80 percent  of the population  of 700,000
will  be  connected, then  the  total  capital cost will  reach  US$56
million.  Assuming a  capital recovery factor of  0.12  (9  percent
interest; 15 years), the annualized  capital costs for expanding the
system  are probably  on the order of US$6.7  million.  Annual  operation
and maintenance  costs are typically about 50 percent of the annual
capital costs for such systems,  or US$3.3  million.  The total  annual
cost of the  Onitsha  water supply  system  is thus roughly  US$10  million,
or N 43 million  at 1987  exchange  rates.  Households  in Onitsha  are thus
already  paying  water vendors  over twice the operation  and maintenance
costs  of the completed  piped  distribution  system,  and 70 percent  of the
total  annual  costs.
6.03  It  should be relatively easy  for  the water authority to
capture  a large share  of the  water vendors'  market--even  if the  prices
charged for water from the piped system  are high enough  to cover the
full costs of supply.  However, the results  of the household  survey
indicate  that  people  perceive  the  water  available  from  tanker  trucks  and
small retail water vendors to be better in quality than the water
available  from the old public  system.  Therefore,  in order  to increase
its  market share,  the ASWC must not only offer a lower-priced  product
than the  vendors,  but  also provide  a higher  quality  product  in terms  of
both  water  quality  and reliable  service.- 24 -
6.04  In  terms of  the  equity implications  of  alternative  water
supply  arrangements,  it is obvious  that the  poor  would be better  off  if
they could  have piped  water in their  dwellings  free  of charge,  with the
costs paid  by  taxes levied on  someone else.  In most developing
countries  this is simply  not going to happen.  Given  this reality,  the
real question  is what policies  should  a water authority  with limited
central government  resources attempt to pursue?  In most cases the
practical choice is between charging a  low price and offering low
quality,  unreliable  service,  on the one hand, and charging  a higWie
price and  one  would hope  high  quality service, on  the  other.
Charging  a low price  typically  means that the water authority  does not
have even enough financ  11 resources  to collect what little revenue
should  be accruing  to it.-
6.05  In Onitsha  this choice  should  be an easy one, even on equity
grounds.  This  study  has  demonstrated  that  the  willingness  of households
to pay for improved  water services  in Onitsha is surprisingly  high.
Households  that can afford to pay for a connection  to a piped water
system  which  charges  the  full  economic  costs  of  water  will  be better  off
as a result  of connecting  than they would be buying  water  from vendors
because  they will receive  more water at a lower  price.  In Onitsha  the
majority  of households  will  clearly  fall  into  this  category.
6.06  The situation for those households  which do not choose to
connect  to the piped  distribution  system  will still be much improved.
Since  most households  will have connections  and will be supplied  with
water cheaper than that previously  available  from tanker trucks, the
price of vended water will fall.  Households  with connections  will
charge less for water than what small retail  water vendors  or tanker
trucks  previously  charged.
12/  There is still a risk that a water authority  will charge  higher
prices  and  not  use  the  resulting  revenues  to provide  a high  quality
service.  Increased revenues  could easily be wasted to fund a
bloated, inefficient  bureaucracy.  Higher prices and  increased
revenues  are a necessary  but not sufficient  condition  for improved
operations  of the  water  authority. Higher  prices  and continued  low
quality  service  may result  in a water authority  losing  even more
market  share  to  vendors.
13/  Installing  meters  and charging  a price for  water which covers  the
full  costs  of supply  is one means  of preventing  such  a situation,
and is one argument  in favor of metering  programs.  If the  water
authority  charges  a flat  rate,  households  with  connections  may also
offer households  without a connection  a flat rate for access to
their  tap.  Such  an arrangement--in  which  one household  with a tap
and  a  flat  rate  is  supplying water  to  many  households--can
represent  a serious  loss  of revenue  to the  water  authority  and  can
result  in demands  that  exceed  system  capacity.- 25 -
6.07  The data presented  in this study  show  that it is incorrect  to
imagine  that  a water  authority  without  central  government  subventions  is
without  resources. At least  in the  case  of Onitsha,  the  ASWC's  greatest
resource  is its right to supply  piped  water services  to a ready  market
which would make any businessman  envious.  In industrialized  countries
water authorities  are typically  regulated  to prevent  them from  abusing
this monopoly privilege  and charging  prices  which are more than their
costs (including  a "fair"  rate of return on capital). Similarly,  the
results of this study show that the revenue  potential  of the ASWC is
tremendous,  and that the population  of Onitsha would be much better
served if the ASWC viewed itself  as a  regulated  utility,  not as an
agency  providing  a social  service.
6.08  In  summary,  the  scale  and  magnitude of  water  vending
activities  in metropolitan  areas of developing  countries  has not been
widely  realized,  nor  has the  value  of information  on such  water  vending
systems been adequately  appreciated  by water resources  engineers or
policy  analysts. This case study  has shown  that  a rapid  reconnaissance
survey  of water  vending  activities  and the  willingness  of households  to
pay can yield valuable  information  for water supply  planning  and, in
this case, unexpected  policy insights.  Studies such  as this are very
inexpensive  relative  to the capital  costs  of urban  water  projects,  and
can provide  valuable  information  for use in the planning  and  design  of
water supply  projects  in developing  countries.APPENDIX
- 26 - Page 1  of 7
APPENDIX: FINANCIAL  ASPECTS  OF THE  WATER  VENDING  BUSINESS  FOR
DIFFERENT  TYPES  OF WATER  VENDORS
Boreholes:  Revenues  and  Prices
The operators and attendants  at the private boreholes  were
generally  unwilling  to be interviewed  about their operations,  and the
few interviews  which were completed  cannot be treated  as an adequate
sample.  Based  on the interviews  with tanker  truck  drivers,  it appears
that  private  boreholes  sell  about  3 mgd in the  dry season  and 1.5  mgd in
the rainy season  to tanker  trucks.  Their annual  revenues  are probably
on the  order  of N 2.6  million. Based  on the  handful  of private  borehole
attendants  which were interviewed,  the average  borehole  sells  about 14
tanker  truck loads in the dry season  and 7 loads  in the rainy season.
Assuming  an average  of 1500 gallons per load, this would imply  daily
sales  on the  or-.er  of 21,000  gallons  in the  dry  season,  which  would  mean
that there are roughly 143 private  boreholes  selling  water to tanker
trucks in Onitsha.  However,  there are probably  far fewer than this,
which  means  that  the  large-volume  private  boreholes  are  probably  serving
many  more tanker  trucks  per  day than  14.
Due to the  inability  to collect  information  from  the  operators
of private boreholes and the limited time in the field, it is not
possible to speculate on whether the private borehole  operators  are
charging  substantially  more  for  water  than  their  costs.
Tanker  Trucks:  Revenues,  Costs,  and  Profits
In other  developing  countries  water  vending  has been found  to
be a  competitive  industry in which the prices of vended water are
determined  by  market forces, and  vendors are  not making excessive
profits  (Whittington,  Lauria,  Okun,  and  Mu, 1988). It  appears,  however,
that  in  Onitsha  the  owners  of  the  tanker  trucks are  capturing
significant  economic  rents (i.e.,  monopoly  profits.) Table  Al presents
estimates  of the revenues,  costs,  and annual profits  of four sizes  of
tanker  trucks  (1000,  1500,  2000,  and 2500  gallon). The  monthly  revenuer
of a tanker  truck  in the  dry season  are about  two  and  a half  times  those
in the rainy  season,  ranging  from  N 1800 to N 2900  in the  rainy  season,
to N 4100 to N 6500 in the  dry season. Operating  costs such  as labor,
gasoline  and  oil,  water  (purchased from  private boreholes), and
maintenance  are  about  80 percent  of the  total  monthly  costs;  the  capital
costs  of the  truck  account  for  the  remaining  20  percent. As illustrated
in  Table Al,  the  capital costs have  been  calculated using  three
different capital recovery  factors (0.12,  0.16, and 0.20).  However,
since the capital costs are a  small proportion  of the total monthly
costs, the different capital recovery factors do not have a  major
influence  on the  total  monthly  costs.
The monthly  profits  are calculated  as the  difference  between
monthly revenues and costs.  For all four sizes of tanker trucks,
monthly  profits  are  much larger  in the  dry season  than  in the  rainy- 27  - APPENDIX
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TALE  Al:  REVENUES,  COS15,  A1O IOFITS  O  TANWER-IRUCt  VENDORS  INONITSHA,  NIGERIA
IntervIo IiConducted  bet_wn  Augu  t  II  to  i5,  1987)
1,000-GALLON TANt  1,500-GALLON TAWC  2,000-GALLON TANW  2,500-GALLON TANW
tN  lta)  tN  tra)  (N  lra)  (Nlrao)
Rainy S.  Dry  S.  Rainy  S.  Dry  S.  Relny  S.  Ory  S.  Ralny  S.  Dry  S.
MONtHLY  REVENtES
(aIllonsaa  of  tater





(Salary  + Allolnce)  248  261  248  261  248  26)  248  261
Ass)  stent
(Salary  + Allonr)  _-  130  ISO  130  1SO  130  1SO  130  150
Subtotal  Labw  Coats  378  411  378  411  378  411  378  411
011  - - - 35  43  35  43  35  43  35  43
Gosolln  --  200  284  200  284  200  284  200  284
Maintenance
Tire*  ---- 42  so  42  sO  42  5  0  42  t  0
Repalie  - 400  430  400  430  400  430  400  430
Subtotal  MaIntn"anc  Costs  442  480  442  480  442  480  442  480
Water  - 330  710  335  870  480  1,030  540  1.070
Subtotal  Operating  Costs
(Labor  + Otl  t  Gollne  + M*Intnonance  Water)  - 1,385  1.928  1,390  2,088  1,515  2,240  1.595  2,288
Capitol  Coats:  (tTruc's  Market  Price  CRF/12  Months
(itf  tF  .12->  yewsl-  -,  9)  - 240  240  260  260  300  300  530  390
(if  tR:  .16  10 years.  10)  - 320  320  347  347  400  400  467  467
(If tO:  .20-n  10  years,  1S%)  400  400  433  433  500  500  583  583
MONIIHLY  TOTAL  COSIS
(Operating  +  CapItal  Coats,  if  CRFt  .12)  1,625  2,16S  1,650  2,348  1,815  2,548  1,945  2.638
(Operating  +  Capital  Costs,  If  R:  .16)  1,708  2,248  1,737  2,43  1,915  2,648  2,062  2,755
(Operating  + Capital  Ooats,  It  CRF:  .20)  1,785  2,328  1,823  2,521  2,015  2,748  2,178  2,871
lOMyTLY  PROFItTS
(Revenues  - Total  Coats, If  CRFt  .121  169  1.968  170  2,956  6S1  3,692  993  3,862
(Revenues  - Total  oats,  If  RF:  .16)  - 89  1,888  83  2,869  581  3,592  876  3,745
(Revenues  - Total  costs.  If  tP:  .20)  9  1,808  f3  2,783  481  3,492  760  3,629
TOTAL  SEASONIL  PROFITS
It  CRs  .12  1,014  11,808  1,020  17.736  4,086  22,152  5,958  23,172
If  CW  .16  534  11,328  498  17,214  3,486  21,552  5,256  22,470
If  tRt  .20  54  10,48  -18  16,698  2,S86  20,952  4,560  21,774
TOTAL  ANIUAL PRWfIlS
It  RFs  .12  12,822  18,796  26,238  29,130
It  CR:  .16  11,862  17,712  25,038  27.726
It  f  t:  .20  - 10,902  16,680  23,838  26,334
ASNIAL PROfITS /  TOTAL  CAPITAL IWNESTMEINT
If  CaFt  .12  0.53  0.72  0.87  0.83
It  CR:  .16  0.49  0.68  0.83  0.79
if  CRW  .20  --- 0-_  - 0.45  0.6"  0.79  0.75- 28  - APPENDIX
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season.  The 1000-gallon  and 1500-gallon  tanker  trucks  essentially  just
cover their costs during the rainy season,  but in the dry season  all
sizes  of trucks  are able to make large  profits. As a percent  of total
capital  at risk (i.e.,  the  market  value  of the  tanker  truck),  the  annual
profits of tanker  truck owners range from 45 percent to 87 percent,
depending on the  size of the truck and the capital recovery factor
assumed.
The owners  of tanker  trucks  thus seem to be making  extremely
high rates  of return  on their  capital  investment. Because  of the short
duration of the fieldwork,  it is not possible  to offer a definitive
explanation  for the existence  of such  monopoly  rents,  but there  appear
to be three  plausible  explanations. The first  relates  to the  structure
of the  market  for  water  sold  by tanker  trucks.
The so-called  union of tanker  truck  drivers  is in reality  an
owners' association.  Jn order to keep track of the sales of their
drivers,  the owners have developed  an elaborate  record-keeping  system
which involves  posting  two union employees  at each borehole  to record
the  amount of  water purchased by each tanker truck driver.  This
information enables the  owners  to  determine whether drivers are
reporting  all of their sales  and thus presumably  prevents  tanker  truck
drivers from selling water on  the side and pocketing the cash (no
information  is available  on the costs of this record-keeping  or other
union  activities,  and  no such costs  have been included  in the  estimates
of the  profitability  of tanker  truck  ownership).  An owners'  association
which  can  arrange  such extensive  cooperation  among  its  members  may well
have the ability to prevent the entry of new tanker  trucks into the
industry  and thus to maintain prices  above free  market levels.  Such
market control could account for  the high profits currently being
achieved  by owners  of tanker  trucks.
Considerable effort was  spent during  the  period of  the
fieldwork  attempting  to obtain the information  in the union borehole
observers'  daily  log  books;  information  from  the  union  on its  membership
and the number of tanker trucks operating  daily in Onitsha  was also
sought.  Despite  extended  negotiations  with the  union  leadership  (which
included hosting a  banquet at  a  local guest house for  the  union
executive  committee),  it  was  not possible  to obtain  any  information  from
the union.  At the end of the  negotiations,  the  president  of the union
offered  the research  team copies  of the  log books  for  a one-year  period
for N10,000 (US$2300),  which was actually  not an unreasonable  price
considering  their value to the study.  This offer was not, however,
accepted.
A second  possible  explanation  for  the  monopoly  profits  may be
that the prospect  of the opening  of the New Onitsha  Water Scheme  has
discouraged  new investment  in the industry.  Over the last few years
anyone contemplating  the purchase  of a tanker  truck  would have known
that the  World Bank-financed  New  Onitsha Water  Scheme promised to
greatly increase the quantity of water in the existing  distribution
network.  This knowledge should  have created significant  uncertainty
about the future  profitability  of tanker  truck  vending.  As it turned- 29 - APPENDIX
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out,  however,  the  opening  of the  new  system  was repeatedly  delayed,  and,
even  when it  opened,  the  existing  distribution  network  was so inadequate
that much of  the business of  the tanker trucks was not  seriously
threatened. Nevertheless,  the uncertainty  surrounding  the  water supply
situation  in Onitsha may have resulted  in a smaller  number  of tanker
trucks  than would otherwise  have existed,  and this restricted  capacity
may have enabled  the individuals  already  in the business  to exert  some
market  control  and  charge  higher  prices.
A third partial explanation  may have to do with the way in
which the capital costs in the monthly accounts  of the tanker truck
owners  were calculated. The tanker  truck  drivers  were asked  about the
market  value  of their  truck. These  market  values  generally  range  from  N
20,000 to N 40,000.  At the time of the survey,  the naira was worth
about US$0.23 (US$1 =  N  4.30).  However, as recently as 1985 the
exchange  rate  was US$1  =  N 0.89. The rapid  devaluation  of the  naira  has
made the pricing of the existing capital stock in Nigeria extremely
difficult. For example,  taxis  have not been  able to raise  their  prices
to cover the replacement  cost of their cars.  Pricing  at sho  t-run
marginal  cost is,  of cotrse,  the profit-maximizing  strategy,  but in the
long  run  the  current overcapacity in  the  taxi  industry will  be
eliminated  as the  existing  taxis  gradually  fall apart,  and prices  will
have  to rise  to cover  the  replacement  costs  of capital  in  a smaller  taxi
industry.
The prices  the  drivers  gave  for the  market  value  of the  tanker
trucks  probably only  partially reflect the  new  foreign exchange
regime.  If tanker  trucks  had to be replaced  at world  prices,  the  naira
price  of tanker  trucks  would  probably  be somewhat  higher.  If the  naira
price of the tanker  trucks  were higher,  the capital  charges  which  were
estimated would be  correspondingly  higher as  well, and  the annual
profits  would  be less than  reported  in  Table  Al.  It  was  not possible  to
determine  how owners of tanker trucks perceive  the capital costs of
operating  their  trucks,  but the  high current  prices  of water charged  by
tanker  trucks  may be closer  to the  real resource  costs  of supplying  the
water than the estimates  of capital costs and profits presented  here
indicate.
Although  this  question  of the  valuation  of the  capital  at risk
in the  tanker  truck  business  introduces  some  additional  uncertainty  into
the picture  of the profitability  of the tanker  trucks,  it cannot  fully
account  for the very high rates  of return  on investment. For example,
the total monthly revenues  of a 2000-gallon  tanker  truck in the dry
season  are  about  N 6240;  the  monthly  operating  costs  are  estimated  to be
N 2248.  Even assuming  a capital  recovery  factor  of 0.20  and  a doubling
of the naira value of the truck,  the monthly  capital  cost would only
increase  from  N 500 to  N 1000. The total  monthly  profits  would  still  be
about  N 3000,  and  the  annual  profits  as a percentage  of total  investment
would  be about  60 percent.APPENDIX
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Small  Retail  Water  Vendors:  Revenues,  Costs,  and Profits
Table A2 presents  an estimate  of weekly  revenues,  costs,  and
profits  of a small retailer  with a 1000-gallon  tank in both the rainy
and dry seasons.  In the dry season  a typical  small  retail  water  vendor
fills his storage  tank twice  a week at a cost of about  N 20 per 1000
gallons.  A family  might consume  200 gallons  for its personal  use and
sell the other 1800 gallons  by the bucket  for N 0.05 per gallon.  Its
weekly  revenues  from  sales  of vended  water  ould  thus  be about  N 90; its
costs  for the  water  sold  would  be about  N 36.
In the  rainy  season  the  typical  small  retailer  sells  about  800
gallons  of water  to neighbors  per  week.  The price  charged  customers  is
about N 0.04 per gallon, slightly  less than in the dry season.  Its
weekly  revenues  are thus  N 32.  The price  paid to tanker  trucks  is  also
lower,  about  N 15  per 1000  gallons,  and the  weekly  cost  of water  sold  to
customers  is about  N 12.The  difference  between  revenues  and water  costs
in the  dry  season  is about  N 54  per  week;  in the  rainy  season  about  N 20
per  week.
The capital cost of the storage tank on a weekly basis is
relatively  small,  whatever  assumptions  one makes about the appropriate
capital  recovery  factor  for the storage  tank and the allocation  of the
costs of the storage tank between water which is used for personal
consumption  and water which is sold to neighbors.  How one calculates
the  profits  of such  a small  retail  water  vendor  thus largely  depends  on
what is assumed  about the cost of the labor  of the person  responsible
for  managing  the  sales  of  water  from  the  storage  tank.
Since  the  monthly  wage in  Onitsha  for  an unskilled  laborer  is
about N  100, if the owner of a storage  tank had to hire someone  to
manage  sales  of water from  a storage  tank,  the  wages  of such  hired  help
would consume  much of the profits  from the enterprize.  However,  the
typical small retail water vendor only has  on the order of  15-30
customers  per  day.  Since  most small  retailers  are  open 14-15  hours  per
day, the  person  responsible  for  managing  the  sale  of water  clearly  would
have a lot of idle time on his hands  if this was the only thing  he or
she did all day.  Most such  individuals  appeared  to be able to do many
other tasks during  the course  of the day; managing  the sale of water
seemed  to be something  which took little  time.  If someone  would  have
been  around  the  area of the  storage  tank  anyway,  the  opportunity  cost  of
the labor  to  manage  the  sale  of  water  would  be  negligible. In this  case
the profits accruing  to a small retail  water vendor, say N  1900 per
year,  could  make  a significant  contribution  to a household's  income.
Distributing  Vendors:  Revenues,  Costs,  and  Prices
Table  A3 presents  the daily  revenues,  costs,  and profits  of a
typical  distributing  vendor  carrying  two  4-gallon  tins in the  rainy  and
dry seasons.  In the dry season  the average such distributing  vendor
sells  about  11 loads  per  day,  charging  N 0.50  per  tin (N  0.12  per- 31 - APPENDIX
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TABLE  A2:  REVENUES  AND COSTS  OF A REPRESENTATIVE  SMALL
RETAIL  WATER  VENDOR  IN  ONITSHA,  NIGERIA  (Per  Week)
Rainy  Season  Dry Season
Quantity  Sold  800  gallons  1800  gallons
Price  N 0.04 /  gallon  N 0.05 /  gallon
Revenues  N 32  N 90
Costs
1.  Water
Cost  per 1000  gallons  N 15  N 20
Quantity  Sold  800  gallons  1800  gallons
Total  Costs  of  Water  N 12  N 36
2.  Capital  negligible  negligible
Net  Revenues
(Not  accounting  for
labor  costs)
per  week  N 20  N 54
per  month  N 84  N 227
gallon). Total  daily  revenues  are thus  on the order  of N 11.  The  cost
of this  water  to the  distributing  vendor  is about  N 2, leaving  a profit
of N 9 per  day (not counting  the cost  of his  labor). The  capital  costs
of the distributing  vendor, i.e.,  the cost of the tins and pole, are
negligible.  In the rainy season  distributing  vendors charge about N
0.30 per tin and sell  about  7 loads  per day.  Revenues  total  about  N 4
per day.  The cost of this  water  to the  distributing  vendor  is about  N
1,  which  leaves  a profit  of N 3 per  day.
The  monthly  returns  to a distributing  vendor  for  his labor  are
thus  about  N 75 (US$17)  in the  rainy  season  and  N 225 (US$52)  in the  dry
season.  These returns  to labor in the rainy season  are approximately
equal to the market  wage for unskilled  labor in Onitsha.  The monthly
returns to labor during the dry season  are over double the wages of
other unskilled  laborers,  but carrying such heavy loads of water is
grueling  work, and it is not surprising  that it commands  a premium.
These results  are consistent  with other  findings  regarding  the implicit
wage rate  for  distributing  vendors  in Kenya (Whittington,  Lauria,  Okun,
and  Mu; 1988),  and it is  not  thought  that  premiums  over  the  minimum  wage
for  unskilled  labor  of this  magnitude  during  the  dry season  are  evidence
of any  market  power  on the  part  of the  distributing  vendors.- 32 - APPENDIX
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TABLE A3:  REVENUES AND COSTS OF A REPRESENTATIVE DISTRIBUTING
VENDOR IN ONITSHA, NIGERIA (Daily)
Rainy Season  Dry Season
Quantity Sold
Loads per day  7 loads  11 loads
(8-gallon loads)  56 gallons  88 gallons
Price charged  N 0.30/4 gallon tin  N 0.50/4-gallon tin
N 0.08/gallon  N 0.12/gallon
Daily Revenues  N 4  N 11
Cost of water
N 0.02/gallon  N 1  N 2
Net Revenues
(not  accounting  for
labor  costs)
a. per  day  N 3  N 9
b. per  month  N 75  N 225- 33  -
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